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He used fake profiles on social networks for work contacts, earned their trust and offered large sums of money in exchange for confidential information.
He dedicated himself for five years, from Beijing, to contact officials working in sensitive fields, such as the military, science, technology and politics.
The government approved a new security law to prevent intrusion from hostile nations and the secret services started a vigilance campaign two years ago.
Called Robin Zhang, even though this is not his real name. It was one of the many names he used a Chinese spy who for the past five years has devoted himself to creating LinkedIn profiles to contact British officials to hand over state secrets in exchange for large sums of money and lucrative deals, according to an investigation by The Times newspaper. They think he was acting almost exclusively from a computer at the headquarters of China’s Ministry of State Security, in Beijing.. They believe he may have obtained important classified information, although how much and what type of information is unknown.
Zhang will operate on an industrial scale. He dedicates himself to building relationships on LinkedIn, which is the leading professional networking site with 930 million users worldwide. Created a fake profile claiming to have studied at King’s College London and being connected to a security company based in Shanghai and use stock images or photos of innocent people for their online profiles.
He spent those five years reaching out to officials working in sensitive fields, such as the military, science and technology, and politics, to build rapport. And then he would ask them for confidential information in exchange for money. He follows an introductory script that describes his job, usually in security or recruiting, before offering cash for a report. Sometimes he invites his contacts to travel to China at an expense.
offered to enter profitable course, For example. He offers recruiting consultants £8,000 for each time he is provided with details of an intelligence candidate. Or a former military intelligence official, large sums of cash in exchange for information about the UK’s anti-terror efforts. He often transfers his contacts to WeChat chats, a Chinese social network for instant messaging, and introduces them to other senior consultants from his company, who are also fake.
Paid trip to China
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I asked for their report relating to the field. At first the topic was trivial, but then he asked them for confidential documents. zhang emphasized the need to show government sources or copies of original documents to prove their origin. Once this was accomplished, he coaxed them into a lasting relationship. And he offers to go to China to give conferences or job interviews. It was actually a trap to coerce them once they got there, it is not known if any of the people contacted went to China.
Several people were contacted by Zhang they felt complimented and even gave him their resumes. The others felt attacked and cut off the conversation. It was they who criticized the activities and methods of the Chinese spies. His LinkedIn page was closed several times, but he reopened it under another identity. He used pseudonyms quite often during these five years. The Times explained that Zhang’s real identity was known, although it could not be published for security reasons.
Tom Tugendhat, the British Foreign Secretary for Security, had warned months ago that Chinese intelligence was using LinkedIn to attack British citizens. “It’s not just government employees who need to be careful, but also companies with sensitive business information as well as researchers and academics,” he said.
two sizes
The UK government is taking steps to stop and prevent these kinds of threats. On the one hand, last month they agreed new national security law which replaced the old official secrecy law and revised the state espionage law in such a way provide law enforcement and intelligence agencies with new and up-to-date tools to prevent, detect and disrupt modern state threats. Gives more powers to intelligence services.
It defines a new crime of foreign interference, which means it is now illegal to carry out actions that interfere with basic rights, such as the right to vote and freedom of expression (as happened with Brexit)“which is essential to democracy in the UK”, according to the Government.
The government also said these powers would apply to individuals acting on behalf of any country, so “the UK will be better equipped to deal with the full spectrum of malicious activity, whether in the form of disinformation, cyberattacks, election interference, or even physical attacks, including the barbaric use of chemical weapons”.
On the other hand, MI-5 (British secret foreign service) launched a campaign called 2021 ‘Think Before You Connect’ (think before you befriend someone) to raise awareness about the dangers of the internet posed by agents of a hostile state. This is basically a warning that there are people working for other countries, especially China they want to get confidential information and that’s why they contact them. This campaign is aimed at raising awareness among more than half a million civil servants and politicians, soldiers, scientists and experts, just like what happened to this Chinese spy.
Chinese spy in parliament
Last year, MI-5 issued a rare security alert to lawmakers warning them that lawyer Christine Lee was a Chinese spy who infiltrated parliament on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party. The warning shocked many lawmakers who found out about it. ANDSpecial remarks from Labor MP Barry Gardiner, who is a close friend of Lee’s, who made him and his son work for him in the parliament building. In fact, he was someone she trusted. He helped her get a seat. Last month Christine Lee slammed the secret service for labeling her a spy and destroying her reputation as a lawyer.
Last year, Ken McCallum, director general of MI-5, publicly warned that infiltrated spies from hostile foreign countries (he did not name names, but he meant China) were using fake profiles on social media, especially LinkedIn, to obtain classified information, and that they have detected over 10,000 fake contacts used by foreign spies.
In July, a report by the parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee said China had penetrated “all sectors” of the UK economy and was even trying to place one of its assets in security services. And The UK faces a “nightmare scenario” in which China will control sensitive national infrastructure, including nuclear power plants, universities and the technology sector. According to official figures, in 2021, known Chinese investment transactions in the UK amounted to 3.59 billion pounds (4.2 billion euros), and there were 845 Chinese-owned companies in the country, compared to 838 in 2020.
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